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African countries are preparing to face the outbreak of COVID-
19, which the World Health Organization declared a Global Public 
Health Emergency of International Concern on 31 January 2020[1] 
and a pandemic 40 days later.[2] COVID-19 is caused by the 
severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2). 
The virus, emerging in early December 2019 in Wuhan, Hubei 
Province, China,[3] has since spread explosively throughout the world. 
Most of Europe and the USA has been severely affected in recent 
weeks despite their relatively high income per capita and robust 
public healthcare systems. In contrast, African countries are poorly 
resourced, have a sizeable vulnerable population, and in recent years 
noticeably demonstrated vulnerability to epidemics.[4]
Many South Africans of all ages have significant risk factors for 
severe COVID-19 outcomes. The pre-existing colliding epidemics of 
HIV infection and tuberculosis (TB), as well as the high prevalence 
of non-communicable diseases such as hypertension, diabetes and 
cardiovascular disease, place a large segment of the population at 
high risk.[5]
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While many countries are preparing to face the COVID-19 pandemic, the reported cases in Africa remain low. With a high burden of both 
communicable and non-communicable disease and a resource-constrained public healthcare system, sub-Saharan Africa is preparing for the 
coming crisis as best it can. We describe our early response as a designated COVID-19 provincial hospital in Cape Town, South Africa (SA). 
While the first cases reported were related to international travel, at the time of writing there was evidence of early community spread. The SA 
government announced a countrywide lockdown from midnight 26 March 2020 to midnight 30 April 2020 to stem the pandemic and save 
lives. However, many questions remain on how the COVID-19 threat will unfold in SA, given the significant informal sector overcrowding and 
poverty in our communities. There is no doubt that leadership and teamwork at all levels is critical in influencing outcomes.
S Afr Med J. Published online 22 April 2020. https://doi.org/10.7196/SAMJ.2020.v110i6.14809
       Published online ahead of print
IN PRACTICE
While South Africa (SA) is classified as an upper-middle-income 
country, it has one of the highest inequality indexes globally, extending 
into the healthcare sector.[6] Public sector facilities remain in a state of 
crisis, while resources available in the private sector, offering world-
class care, are accessible to only 16% of the population.[5] The SARS-
CoV-2 pandemic demands a unified response across society and 
emphasises the need for a universal healthcare approach.[7]
Cape Town is at high risk for COVID-19, given the frequency 
of air travel and its popularity as a travel destination. Tygerberg 
Hospital (TBH), the largest public sector tertiary referral hospital 
in the Cape Town Metropole in Western Cape Province, is located 
close to the international airport and serves over 3.4 million people, 
mostly vulnerable populations from densely populated low-income 
communities and rural areas. We report on our early experiences as a 
designated provincial COVID-19 centre preparing for the imminent 
community outbreak of COVID-19.
Ethics approval for this article was obtained from the Health 
Research Ethics Committee of Stellenbosch University (ref. no. 
N20/04/006_COVID-19).
Phase 1 response (imported cases)
The TBH adult and paediatric infectious diseases (ID) teams in 
collaboration with the Unit for Infection Prevention and Control 
(UIPC) and the Western Cape Centre for Disease Control (CDC) 
and Emergency Medicine Services (EMS), spearheaded a rapid and 
early response preceding any confirmed COVID-19 cases in the 
country. The aim of the first response was to prepare for potential 
COVID-19 cases arriving via port health. A separate entrance to 
the hospital was identified and safe transfer of suspected cases to 
the designated isolation ward was established by deploying security 
services, dedicating elevators and using mobile technology to keep 
staff up to date with progress of a transfer. The first designated 
management area at TBH was the 32-bed respiratory isolation 
ward for TB patients. Existing patients were either discharged to 
community care, or referral was fast-tracked to designated TB 
hospitals. The ward has eight single isolation rooms and four 6-bed 
rooms to cohort confirmed cases. The initial workload was shared 
among the small group of ID clinicians and UIPC practitioners. On 
6 February 2020, a ‘dry run’ with a dummy patient was done to test 
the processes on the planned route from airport to isolation room.
Initially, all potential COVID-19 ‘persons under investigation’ 
(PUI) required approval for testing from the National Institute of 
Communicable Diseases (NICD) in Johannesburg, the national 
reference laboratory responsible for managing epidemics. The 
samples were dispatched to the NICD central laboratory with results 
being available after 48 - 96 hours. Processing of test samples has 
since been decentralised to the on-site National Health Laboratory 
Service (NHLS) virology laboratory, reducing sample turnaround 
time to 12 - 48 hours.
The first cases
From 28 January 2020, the initial cohort of potential COVID-19 
cases were mostly previously healthy travellers from China who 
self-presented to TBH for screening. The first 4 patients admitted 
tested negative for SARS-CoV-2 but positive for influenza B (n=1), 
influenza A (n=2) and parainfluenza (n=1), a reminder that viral 
infections traditionally less common during our summer months are 
often imported by travellers from the northern hemisphere.
The first confirmed COVID-19 case in SA was announced on 5 
March 2020, a traveller returning to Johannesburg from Italy, while 
the first case in the Western Cape was announced on 11 March 2020, 
a traveller returning from Germany, Austria, Switzerland and Turkey. 
Soon afterwards, referrals from primary and secondary public 
healthcare centres and independent private practitioners escalated. 
From 28 January to 15 March we had screened 93 patients.
During this time the ID team and UIPC staff were inundated with 
calls for advice from the public, including commercial trade and 
shipping agents, and schools. ID and UIPC also served as a resource 
for both community and healthcare facilities. The team drafted 
standard operating procedures and created posters with instructions 
for visual display. Educational material was shared widely within the 
institution.
Phase 2 response (limited local 
transmission)
During phase 2, the General Internal Medicine team redirected 
human resources, senior and junior, to support the ID team. By mid-
March, a dedicated COVID-19 testing unit was established outside 
the hospital entrance situated closest to the hospital’s main gate. 
Clear signage directed the public towards this entrance and away 
from other entrances, ensuring that patient flow was in alignment 
with infection prevention and control (IPC) best practices. The 
screening area included a mobile unit and a tent provided by the 
EMS Disaster Medicine Unit, clinical cubicles, two negative-pressure 
sampling rooms (providing 60 air changes per hour, to allow for rapid 
clearance of potential airborne pathogens and therefore rapid reuse of 
the rooms) and an associated repurposed operating theatre equipped 
to manage patients presenting in respiratory distress. The unit was 
staffed with a multidisciplinary team of medical staff and registered 
nurses from the divisions of ID, UIPC, Emergency Medicine (EM), 
Paediatrics and Internal Medicine. A ‘war room’ was commissioned 
for senior leaders to meet regularly and plan a co-ordinated ‘whole of 
hospital’ response.
Patient and staff information
Educational material, including pamphlets and videos, was created by 
UIPC and paediatric and adult ID and circulated widely to staff in the 
hospital and to other healthcare facilities provincially and nationally 
via various electronic and social media platforms. It included videos 
on how to perform a nasopharyngeal swab and how to ‘don’ and ‘doff ’ 
personal protective equipment (PPE), and a video on self-isolation. The 
educational video on safe self-isolation was sent directly to patients via 
WhatsApp. There was extensive hands-on training and re-training, 
during which staff fears were addressed. Staff fears were extensive, but 
continuous support from IPC practitioners, role modelling from senior 
clinicians, and increasing hands-on experience empowered most with 
confidence and pride in what they were doing.
COVID-19 public hotline
The National Department of Health established a COVID-19 public 
health hotline, which was soon put under enormous pressure as call 
volumes exceeded capacity. A provincial 24-hour hotline to assist the 
public was established within 2 days, staffed by EM practitioners and 
student volunteers. Clinical support for the hotline was from EM and 
ID consultants and registrars.
Personal protective equipment
Conflicting early guidelines and recommendations created confusion 
around appropriate PPE use. There was also a conflict between the 
guidelines and media images of healthcare staff wearing full body 
coverage in Wuhan. Crucial to the whole hospital response has been a 
concerted effort to standardise PPE use. A policy aimed at protecting 
this valuable resource was developed, ensuring appropriate use, 
minimising wastage and preventing stock shrinkage. This included 
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establishing a dedicated team to monitor use and follow up when use 
exceeded the predicted norms.
Staff health
The Occupational Health unit developed protocols for individual risk 
assessment and classification of staff members at risk to protect those 
considered at risk for severe disease. A process was implemented 
to provide a personalised protection plan, including the provision 
of special leave for very vulnerable individuals. Likewise, a system 
was implemented to test staff members presenting with respiratory 
symptoms that would allow for early return to work and prevent staff 
shortages.
State of National Disaster
On 15 March 2020, President Cyril Ramaphosa declared a State 
of National Disaster and advised all international travellers to be 
screened for testing. This announcement resulted in a 25-fold 
increase in cases screened. The test results were communicated to 
the patients by the outpatient ID team, subsequently supported 
by a group of volunteers as the test numbers rapidly escalated. 
Groups of staff from other disciplines in the hospital, as well as 
from surrounding community health centres, are being trained in 
testing and IPC protocols through this unit. Simple measures such 
as separating and masking those with coughs and getting patients to 
move with their chairs to different evaluation stages saved valuable 
resources. The TBH intensive care unit (ICU) capacity was reviewed. 
The medical ICU, consisting of 7 existing ICU beds and 8 high-care 
beds, was identified to manage critically ill COVID-19 patients and 
PUI. An infrastructural assessment identified 42 potential ICU bed 
spaces. Of these, 28 ‘functional’ ICU beds equipped with ventilators, 
monitors and other necessary equipment were commissioned prior 
to the first COVID-19 admission. The lack of supply of ventilators 
(internationally) limited this response to 28 beds. However, the 
number of ICU beds is still woefully short of the estimated need.
Phase 3 response (community spread)
In anticipation of a community outbreak, the hospital management 
co-ordinated a multidivision and multidepartmental effort. All non-
essential outpatient clinics were rapidly scaled down or closed and 
elective theatre slates were cancelled, along with timeous inpatient 
discharges. Within 3 weeks, the following were established: a dedicated 
24-hour screening and testing unit able to triage and manage severely 
ill patients presenting de novo, fully staffed COVID-19-dedicated 
wards with isolation capabilities and daily operational meetings 
keeping track of PPE, and pharmacy and other equipment stock. The 
immediately available COVID-19 bed capacity was expanded to 172 
beds with plans to escalate in a phased response as needed. Further 
expansion to the ICU and high-care facilities included the conversion 
of a 31-bed ward adjacent to the ICU into a high-care facility with 
dedicated intubation facilities, and converting an unused kitchen to 
shower facilities for staff. Critically ill ‘non-COVID-19’ patients were 
diverted to other ICU facilities in the hospital (including existing 
general surgery, cardiothoracic, and neurosurgical ICU beds).
Staffing and volunteer recruitment
Hospital medical staff were divided into COVID-19 and non-
COVID-19 teams. The non-COVID-19 teams provided ongoing 
care to patients in need of essential medical care, as well as intensive 
telephonic outreach and support to secondary and district hospitals. 
Volunteers have been recruited from surrounding private institutions 
and universities for duty when the caseload increases. The rapid 
execution of these measures in this overburdened and understaffed 
public hospital represents unprecedented co-ordination of services 
and dedicated interdisciplinary leadership.
Additional infrastructure
An on-site light infrastructure facility for triage, testing and treating 
was commissioned by the hospital to facilitate respiratory triage outside 
the hospital, and will allow for additional bed space if the need arises.
The lockdown
Given the potential consequences of community spread of COVID-
19 in SA, the SA government announced a countrywide lockdown 
from midnight 26 March 2020 to midnight 16 April 2020, now 
extended for 2 more weeks, in an effort to stem the pandemic in 
SA. On 6 April 2020, extended screening and testing to densely 
occupied communities was rolled out. This proactive response aims 
to flatten the epidemic curve and it is hoped will reduce the burden 
on healthcare facilities like TBH.
Conclusions
We are acutely aware that our measures may be insufficient in the 
event of a widespread community outbreak. Predicting how the 
pandemic will unfold in SA is difficult. Many South Africans come 
from marginalised communities and live either in densely populated 
informal housing or shared accommodation, often with the elderly 
and the young in one room. At this stage, it is unknown whether HIV 
or TB-related lung disease will result in more severe illness. We are 
also concerned about the potential ‘collateral damage’ of cancelled 
elective surgery and outpatient visits on the overall morbidity and 
mortality of an already constrained public healthcare system.
Strategic leadership is fundamental to any emergency response. 
The critical lesson is to act swiftly and respond proportionately. 
Key to our response are practical leaders who are adaptable and can 
communicate while the crisis is unfolding, reflect on what they have 
learned daily, and implement changes immediately. An essential 
element in our whole response to COVID-19 is, and will continue to 
be, multidisciplinary teamwork.
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